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An Analysis of Bank Defenses to
Check Forgery And Alteration
Claims under Uniform Commercial
Code Articles 3 and 4: Claimants'
Negligence and Failure to Give Notice
JOHN W. HINCHEY*
In addressing the dual issues of check forgeries and alteration claims
faced by many banks, the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth a system of
rights and obligations to remedy these problems. In addition, Articles
Three and Four also present an array of bank defenses, the availability of
which are largely determined by the bank's position in this system. In this
article, the author analyzes the inconsistencies and uncertainties inherent
in this framework, and determines that there is much room for creativity
on the part of banker's counsel in this area.
I. INTRODUCTION: How THE U.C.C. ALLOCATES FORGERY AND
ALTERATION LOSSES
A. Three Classic Cases
There are three classic cases in which check forgeries or altera-
tions typically result in claims against banks. These include in-
stances of forged drawer's signatures, forged endorsements, and
* Phillips, Hart & Mozely, Atlanta, Georgia, LL.B., Emory University, 1965,
LL.M, Emory University 1966, Oxford University, 1976-77. Assistant Attorney Gen-
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material alterations.'
If a forgery2 or material alteration 3 is discovered prior to the
payor bank's final payment,4 the item is "bounced" or returned
through the chain of holders to the wrongdoer, or, most likely, to
the party who took the item from the wrongdoer. 5 In such an
event, either the wrongdoer may be compelled to pay the item, or
the party taking the item from the wrongdoer must suffer the loss.
If, however, the forged or altered item is finally paid, varying
rights and duties are created, depending upon which of the three
typical cases mentioned above is involved.
In the case of a forged drawer's signature, the drawer will gen-
erally demand that the drawee bank recredit his account because
of the improper payment.6 Because the drawee bank has already
I. J. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS (5th Ed., 1979), states that checks
which are altered, forged, or which bear forged endorsements, "are the kinds of
problems that land in court most frequently." Id. at 22-23.
2. The term "forgery" is not defined in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), but is included within the Code's definition of an "unauthorized signa-
ture," i.e., "one made ... without actual, implied or apparent authority ......
U.C.C. § 1-201(43). The elements of a forgery have been held to be: a.) a false
making or alteration of a written instrument with b.) a fraudulent intent c.) on a
document which, if genuine, would have had some legal efficacy or created legal
rights or duties. See State v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 414 P.2d 281 (Okla.
1966).
3. A material alteration is defined in the Code as:
Any alteration of an instrument which changes the contract of any party
thereto in any material respect, including any such change in (a) the
number or relations of the parties; of (b) an incomplete instrument, by
completing it otherwise than as authorized; or (c) the writing as signed,
by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
U.C.C. § 3-407(1). All citations or references in this article to "the Code" or
"U.C.C." are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1972 Official Text, with Comments,
published by West Publishing Company.
4. As defined in U.C.C. § 4-213(1) A.L.I. Uniform Commercial Code (West
1972).
5. The Code rationale is that if the drawer's signature is forged, he cannot be
liable on the instrument in the absence of negligence or ratification. U.C.C. § 3-
01(1); see id. §3-404; see also id. § 3-406. If there is a material alteration, the
drawer is discharged to the extent that the item has been raised in amount.
U.C.C. § 3-407. If there is a forged endorsement, the possessor of the instrument
takes no better title than the forger or thief and, thus, cannot qualify as a "holder"
in order to enforce the instrument against the drawer. U.C.C. § 1-201(20); see id.
§ 3-201(1); id. § 3-301; id. § 3-404. Consequently, any provisional settlements along
the collection chain will be revoked, thus leaving the loss upon the shoulders of
the forger's immediate transferee. U.C.C. § 3-414; see id. § 3-417; id. § 4-201; id. § 4-
301; id. § 4-303. See CLARK & SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosrrs, CoLLEc-
TONS AND CREDIT CARDS, 133-34 (1970).
6. Under the Code, the drawer cannot be liable since his valid signature does
not appear on the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-401(1). Nor can the drawer bank charge
the drawer's account, since a forged signature is not "properly payable" under
U.C.C. § 4-401(1). Another basis for the drawee bank's liability to the drawer is
said to lie in their contractual relationship; there is an express or implied agree-
ment between the drawee bank and the depositor that the bank will only charge
the depositor's account according to his order. See, e.g., White v. Georgia R.R.
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made final payment,7 it cannot recover from prior parties to the
instrument, except from: a.) the wrongdoer;8 b.) one who received
payment with knowledge of the wrong;9 or c.) a non-Holder In
Due Course (HIDC) who still holds proceeds from the item.'0
Nevertheless, the drawee bank will generally suffer the loss."
When a forged endorsement occurs, either the drawer or payee
may have a cause of action against the drawee bank for improper
payment.12 The drawee bank, however, may then state a claim
against prior parties to the instrument for breach of warranties. 3
Alternatively, some cases have held that to avoid a duplicity of ac-
tion, either the drawer or payee may claim directly against the de-
positary or collecting bank.14
Bank & Trust Co., 30 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. App. 1944); Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co., 97 A.2d 857 (Pa., 1953). If the bank pays an instrument with a forged
signature, contrary to the depositor's order or without his authority, the bank is
said to have paid from its own funds, rather than from the depositor's account.
Kares Constr. Co. v. Associates Discount Corp., 163 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio App. 1960);
Central Nat'l Bank v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 171 Va. 289, 198 S.E. 883 (1938).
7. U.C.C. § 3-418.
8. The forger's signature would operate to bind him. U.C.C. § 3-404(1). For
example, this liability is usually of little value since he will typically be unavaila-
ble or otherwise "judgment proof."
9. Pursuant to the warranties given by prior parties under U.C.C. § 3-
417(1) (b), and U.C.C. § 4-207(1) (b).
10. For example, if the party still holds proceeds, he presumably has not paid
"value" for the item or has not otherwise "changed his position in reliance on the
payment." Thus, the exceptions to U.C.C. § 3-418 would apply.
11. This result is based on the doctrine first established in Price v. Neal, 97
Eng. Rep. 871, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762) and carried forward into the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (NIL). BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 62 (6th
ed. 1938). The "final payment" rule has been resisted and strongly criticized by
such scholars as White & Summers. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 519-29 (1972).
12. With respect to the drawer, the item is not "properly payable" under
U.C.C. § 4-401(1) and thus cannot be charged to his account. See supra note 6.
The payee's right against the drawee bank lies in conversion, as codified in U.C.C.
§ 3-419(1) (c).
13. U.C.C. § 3-417(1)(2); see also id. § 4-207(1)(2).
14. Cases allowing a direct action by the drawer against a depositary or col-
lecting bank are: Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America, 275 Cal. App.
2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969); International Industries, Inc. v. Island State Bank, 458
F. Supp. 886 (D. Tex. 1971); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Atlas Supply Co., 121
Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632 (1970); Insurance Co. of North America v. Purdue Nat'l
Bank of Lafayette, 401 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. App. 1980); Underpinning & Foundation
Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979). However,
there is still a split of authority. See, e.g., Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield, 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962); and Brighton,
Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 N.J. Super. 101, 422 A.2d 433 (1980).
For cases allowing a payee whose endorsement was forged to bring a direct ac-
Generally, in a case of a material alteration, the drawer's liabil-
ity on an altered item is restricted to its original terms. To the ex-
tent that the drawer's bank account has been debited due to a
material alteration, the drawer may demand that the drawee bank
recredit his account. 15 The drawee bank, in turn, may seek recov-
ery from prior transferors of the altered check for breach of war-
ranties.16 As in the case of forged endorsements, at least one
court has held that the aggrieved drawer may seek relief directly
from the depositary or collecting bank.1 7
B. Bank Defenses
The pattern of rights outlined above includes possible claims
against banks in the case of forged or altered checks. These
claims are subject to the defenses articulated by the Uniform
Commercial Code which may be available to a defendant bank.
Section 3-404 of the Code states that an unauthorized signature
or forgery is binding on the claimant if he "ratifies it or is pre-
cluded from denying it. . . ." This section has a "catch-all" effect
which incorporates not only the defense of ratification,' 8 but also
the defenses of apparent authority (usually granted to a non-
agent by careless conduct of the principal),19 estoppel,20 negli-
gence of various types,2 1 and failure to give timely notice of the
forgery. 22
tion, see Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 311 (Pa. 1965);
Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); Salsman
v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (1968), Citizens
State Bank v. National Surety Corp., 612 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1980). Although the major-
ity of decisions have allowed such a direct action by the payee, a number of courts
have continued to apply the literal provisions of U.C.C. § 3-419(3) and have denied
such a cause of action. See, e.g., Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So. 2d 553 (1972); and
Gillen v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 274 Md. 96, 333 A.2d 329 (1975).
15. U.C.C. § 4-401(2) (a). For pre-Code cases discussing this principle, see, e.g.,
First State Bank of Lyford v. Parker, 27 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); State
Nat'l Bank v. Lark, 134 Ark. 432, 204 S.W. 101 (1918).
16. U.C.C. § 3-417(1) (c); see also id. § 3-417; id. § 4-207(1) (c); id. § 4-207(2) (c).
17. Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1978). However, there is contrary authority; see, e.g., Gregory-Salisbury
Metal Products, Inc. v. Whitney Nat'l Bank of New Orleans, 160 So. 2d 813 (La.
App. 1964).
18. See, Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 967 (1979) on what acts may constitute ratification
of forged or unauthorized signatures under U.C.C. § 3-404.
19. U.C.C. § 3-403(1); see also, Senate Motors, Inc. v. Indus. Bank of Washing-
ton, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1971).
20. See, e.g., 11 Am. Jur. Release § 789 (1963).
21. See U.C.C. § 3-406; see also id. § 4-406. See infra Sections II-IV and accom-
panying discussion.
22. See infra section V discussing U.C.C. § 4-406(a). See also U.C.C. § 4-207(4),
which provides that "[UI nless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is
made within a reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the
person liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making
claim."
4
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The situation where a drawer issues a check to an imposter or
"fictitious payee" is addressed by section 3-405. Essentially, the
section presumes the drawer's negligence in his not taking
greater care to confirm the payee's identity.23 Additionally,
notwithstanding contributory negiligence on the part of the bank,
this section appears to provide a complete defense. 24 To avoid in-
curring liability, the bank must have acted in good faith,25 and
some cases have interpreted the section as requiring that the
bank must have acted without negligence, in accordance with
"reasonable commercial standards." 26
Section 3-419(3) would seem to limit the liability of a depositary
or collecting bank to "any proceeds remaining in [its] hands" if it
acts "in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable com-
mercial standards" applicable to the banking industry.27 How-
ever, this apparent protection is rendered somewhat illusory
since the depositary or collecting bank is subject to full liability
pursuant to its warranties. 28 Thus, many jurisdictions have sim-
ply ignored, or refused to apply the section in allowing a direct ac-
tion against the banks by the payee. 29
As provided in section 3-406, negligence contributing to the
making of a forgery or alteration is a defense in favor of an HIDC,
drawee, or "other payor." Although a drawee bank may raise this
defense, difficult questions, resulting in divergent authority, have
23. U.C.C. § 3-405 comment 4; 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 932 (2d
ed., 1971) (hereinafter cited as ANDERSON).
24. The section was so construed in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Ex-
change Bank of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Wis., 1974); and Hicks-Costarino
Co., Inc. v. Pinto, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), and has thus been
criticized by ANDERSON, supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Trust Co., 169 N.J.
Super. 488, 404 A.2d 1288 (1979), and Board of Higher Ed. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86
Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1976). "Good Faith" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
26. See, e.g., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Crisp, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 138 (Ky. App.
1979); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Center Bank, 202 Neb. 274, 275 N.W.2d 73 (1979);
Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46
N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 7319 (1979). Cf., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Point Pleasant West Virginia, 150 W.Va. 238, 144 S.E.2d 703 (1965); and Mc-
Connico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973) (circumstances denying
the bank's status as holder in due course).
27. "Reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such rep-
resentative" relates to "the banking business" when applied to banks. See Atlas
Bldg. Supply Co., Inc. v. First Indep. Bank of Vancouver, 15 Wash. App. 367, 550
P.2d 76 (1976).
28. U.C.C. § 4-207.
29. See cases cited supra note 14.
arisen concerning: a.) whether a depositary or collecting bank
may raise this defense against a drawer or payee;3 0 and
b.) whether a drawee bank must assert this defense against its
ctistomer (the drawer) as a condition precedent to claiming
against a depositary or collecting bank for breach of warranties.3 1
The answer in both cases appears to be in the affirmative, based
on the most recent authorities. 32
Apparently, section 3-406 may also be asserted as a defense
where the drawer or drawee bank attempts to avoid the effect of
the "final payment" rule33 by showing that the depositary bank
was not an HIDC, or otherwise failed to act in good faith. In such
a case, the Fifth Circuit held that a depositary bank could assert
the drawer's "alleged negligence as a defense," presumably with
reference to section 3-406.34
Two additional sections of Article 4 of the Code set forth de-
fenses which banks may utilize as defenses to payment of losses
arising from altered checks.
Code section 4-207(4) provides that unless a claim for breach of
warranty under this section is made within a reasonable time af-
30. In other words, the Code's design is that a drawer or payee will only claim
against the drawee bank which, in turn, will claim against the collecting and de-
positary banks for breach of warranties. However, this design has been frustrated,
as mentioned above, by courts having allowed direct actions by drawers and pay-
ees. For cases discussing the issue of whether, in such cases, the collecting or de-
positary bank should be allowed to raise U.C.C. § 3-406 negligence as a defense,
see Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exchange Bank, 55 F.R.D. 436 (E.D.Wis.
1972); Trust Company of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A. v. Port Terminal and
Warehousing Co., 153 Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 254 (1980).
31. U.C.C. § 4-406(5) requires a drawee or payor bank having a valid notice de-
fense against its drawer to assert the defense or else the drawee bank's claim
against the collecting or depositary bank is waived. Since U.C.C. § 3-406 has no
similar provision, the question has been litigated as to whether the drawee bank's
failure to raise this defense would similarly bar its action against a collecting or
depositary bank. See, e.g., Long Island Trust Co. v. National Bank of North
America, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), and Mellon Nat'l Bank v.
Merchants Bank of New York, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), holding
that U.C.C. § 3-406 must have been asserted.
Contra, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
64 Misc. 2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1970). Two other cases discusing this issue are
Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 373, 406 A.2d 494 (1979); Girard
Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1236 (D.N.J. 1979).
32. See, e.g., Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920,
148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978); East Gadsden Bank v. First Nat'l City Bank of Gadsden,
50 Ala. App. 576, 281 So. 2d 431 (1973); see also discussions in ANDERSON, supra
note 23 at 630-631, 938-945; Whaley, "Negligence and Negotiable Instruments", 53
N.C. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Whaley); Feulner, Check Forger-
ies: Variations of Rules of Liability Based on Fault - U.C.C. Defenses §§ 3-406,
and 4-406, 12 ARiz. L. REv. 417, 432 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Feulner).
33. U.C.C. § 3-418.
34. Perini Corp. v. The First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398, 407
(5th Cir. 1977).
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ter having learned of the breach, the bank will be discharged to
the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making a claim.35
Section 4-406 deals with negligence in failing to detect and report
a forgery or alteration in sufficient time to protect the bank. The
section operates only in favor of the drawee bank in defense of a
claim by its drawer-customer. 36 If the drawee bank waives or fails
to raise a valid section 4-406 defense against its customer, the
drawee bank is precluded from recouping its loss against a col-
lecting bank or other prior party to the instrument.37
Without question, the most useful (and the most litigated) bank
defenses to check forgery or alteration claims arise under U.C.C.
sections 3-406 and 4-406. These sections address a claimant's neg-
ligence in contributing to the forgery or alteration, or his failure to
give notice to the bank when the impropriety was discovered.
The remainder of this article focuses upon these two Code
sections.
II. NEGLIGENCE CONTRIBUTING TO FORGERY OR ALTERATION:
U.C.C. SECTION 3-406
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature
is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a
holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the in-
strument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial
standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
38
A. Overview
Section 3-406 creates a defense, rather than a cause of action.39
35. Again, the Code anticipates that such claims against depositary or collect-
ing banks will only be made by the drawee bank; see supra note 14. However, if
direct actions may be brought by drawers or payees, it would seem that this sec-
tion's "reasonable time" requirement would be available to the bank in such a di-
rect action.
36. Atlas Bldg. Supply Co. Inc. v. First Indep. Bank of Vancouver, 15 Wash.
App. 367, 550 P.2d 26 (1976).
37. U.C.C. § 4-406(5).
38. U.C.C. § 3-406. There are no variations among the states as to this provi-
sion; ANDERSON, § 3-406(2) at 940(l).
39. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 5. However, in a recent decision, a United States
District Court rejected a defense by the defendant depositary bank that the plain-
tiff drawee bank failed to assert its drawer's negligence under U.C.C. § 3-406.
While holding that the depositary bank was liable to the drawee bank, notwith-
standing the drawer's negligence, the court indicated that the depositary bank
might have a common law cause of action against the drawer for its negligence in
It does not, however, define the key terms "negligence" or "rea-
sonable commercial standard of the drawee's or payor's busi-
ness." Anderson states that the range of negligent behavior is
"limited only by the limits of man's capacity for conducting slov-
enly business transactions."40 A party's actions are to be judged
by reference to the setting and peculiar circumstances. For exam-
ple, private individuals may be judged by a more informal stan-
dard than commercial enterprises, 4 1 and in all but the clearest
cases, the decision is left solely to the judgment of the trier of
fact.42
B. A Bank Must Act According to "Reasonable Commercial
Standards"
Before a bank can assert the claimant's negligence as a defense,
the bank must affirmatively prove that it paid the instrument in
good faith43 and according to the reasonable standards of the
banking profession.44 If the defendant bank fails to make such a
showing, it cannot take advantage of section 3-406 as a defense,
regardless of the claimant's negligence. 45 The reasonable com-
mercial standards test typically has been applied to the following
classic cases:
1. Accepting or cashing items without all required signatures
or endorsements
If a customer's signature card requires more than one author-
ized signature, the acceptance or cashing of an item without all of
the required signatures is usually evidence of a failure to act ac-
causing the forgery and, presumably, the bank's loss. See, Girard Bank v. Mount
Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J., 1979).
40. Anderson, supra note 23, at 626.
41. See, e.g., Perley v. Glastonbury Bank and Trust Co., 170 Conn. 691, 368 A.2d
149 (1976).
42. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 3; see also Trust Company of Georgia Bank of Sa-
vannah, N.A. v. Port Terminal and Warehousing Co., 153 Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d
254 (1980).
43. Defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(19); see also Perley v. Glastonbury Bank and
Trust Company, 170 Conn. 691, 368 A.2d 149 (1976).
Similarly, under U.C.C. § 3-419(3), a depositary or collecting bank has the bur-
den of proving its "good faith" and that it acted "in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards." See R.A. Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Or. 55, 508
P.2d 428 (1973).
44. See Hermetic Refrigeration Company, Inc. v. Central Valley Nat'l. Bank,
Inc., 493 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 6; see also Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v. Kidwell
Constr. Co., 472 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1971); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Hovey, 412
N.E.2d 889, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Crisp, 608 S.W.2d
51, 53 (Ky. 1980).
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cording to reasonable commercial standards.4 6 However, where it
is not clear that a check requires two signatures, the bank may be
able to avoid liability. For example, in Dominion Construction,
Inc. v. First National Bank of Maryland, 47 the drawer intended to
issue a check payable jointly to "Town & Country Decorating, Inc.
and Conwed Corporation." Instead, the check was made payable
to "Town & Country Decorating and Conwed." The drawer's em-
ployee endorsed the item in his own name, "d/b/a/ Town & Coun-
try Decorating and Conwed." The bank allowed the item to be
deposited in the employee's account, after having questioned the
employee concerning the use of two names in his trade name and
having received what was thought to be a reasonable explanation
under the circumstances. The court held that this was "not a case
in which the check reasonably appeared to be payable to joint
payee;" moreover, there was "nothing on the face of the check to
justifiably cause any suspicion on the part of [the bank], nor was
there any other irregularity in the transaction."48 The court also
noted that this was a deposit to the employee's account, rather
than the more risky act of paying cash across the teller's cage.
2. Failure to verify signatures
A number of banks have adopted the practice of not verifying
signatures on checks below a certain amount - an amount they
are understandably reluctant to disclose.49 This is clearly an as-
sumption of a calculated risk, since no reported case has absolved
a bank from the duty to check signature cards. For example, in
Jackson v. First National Bank of Memphis,5o the drawee bank
was found negligent under section 3-406 in failing to "closely ex-
amine" the drawer's signature and compare it with the signature
card on file. The bank, of course, assserted that this procedure
"was not practical under modern banking methods."5 '
46. See, e.g., Key Appliance, Inc. v. National Bank of North America, 75 A.D. 92,
428 N.Y.S.2d. 238 (1980).
47. 271 Md. 154, 315 A.2d 69 (1974).
48. Dominion Constr. Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 271 Md. 154, 166-67,
315 A.2d 69, 74-76 (1974).
49. U.C.C. Brief No. 13: Respective Liabilities of a Bank and Its Customers on
Forged or Altered Checks, 19 PRAc. LAW. 71, 79 (1973) (hereinafter cited as "U.C.C.
Brief No. 13").
50. 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966).
51. Id. at 113.
Generally, a bank will be held to have acted according to rea-
sonable commercial standards if it shows that:
a.) Its tellers were properly trained and generally instructed to check
and verify signatures;5
2
b.) The signature card was attached to the cancelled check file;5 3 and
c.) There was an obvious similarity of signatures on the the items and
cards which could be verified by lay witnesses.
5 4
3. Allowing the wrongdoer to cash or deposit a corporate item
to his personal account
It is generally contrary to reasonable commercial standards for
a depositary bank to allow a party to either cash or deposit to his
own account an item which is made payable to some other payee
(usually a corporation), unless the depositary bank has specific
authority to do so. For example, in Seattle-First National Bank v.
Pacific National Bank of Washington,55 the depositary bank was
held to have not acted in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards when it allowed checks payable to a business corpora-
tion to be endorsed and deposited to the account of a business en-
tity of a different name. The bank's action was a violation of its
own manual of operation. Some courts have considered that the
depositary bank has "notice of a claim" 56 by the true owner
against the instrument when the bank allows checks made paya-
ble to one entity to be endorsed in the payee's name and paid to a
different party.5 7
A depositary bank may also be found negligent in cashing a
drawer's check made payable to the bank and allowing it to be de-
posited to the individual's account. 58 In fact, a discrepancy in the
52. Parsons Travel, Inc. v. Hoag, 18 Wash. App. 588, 570 P.2d 445 (1977). How-
ever, there is also authority that once the clerk becomes "familiar" with the depos-
itor's signature, the verification may be based upon the clerk's memory. See
Huber Glass Co., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 138 N.W.2d 157
(1965).
53. Parsons Travel, Inc. v. Hoag, 18 Wash. App. 588, 570 P.2d 445 (1977).
54. George Whalley Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App. 2d
205, 380 N.E. 2d 742 (1977); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492
P.2d 534 (1972).
55. 22 Wash. App. 46, 587 P.2d 617 (1978).
56. U.C.C. § 3-304(2). "The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instru-
ment when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in
payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own bene-
fit or otherwise in breach of duty." Id. This section precludes the bank from
H.I.D.C. status.
57. See, e.g., Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Bismark, 259 N.W.2d 667
(N.D. 1977). A collecting bank has been held to have acted contrary to "reasonable
commercial standards" under U.C.C. § 3-419(3), by allowing a forger to deposit a
check payable to a corporation in the personal account of the forger. See Belmar
Trucking Corp. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1970).
58. Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 372 N.Y.S.2d 18 (N.Y., 1975).
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account number may be critical, as was the case in First National
Bank of San Antonio v. Nicholas and Barrera. 59 Here the checks
were made payable to "Depositary Account No. 607,"60 but were
permitted to be deposited in an account of a different number,
without endorsements. The Texas Court found that this action
clearly evidenced a failure to exercise reasonable commercial
standards.
In these situations the bank has a duty to inquire as to the spe-
cific authority of the presenting party to endorse and cash or de-
posit the instrument to his own account. A depositary bank
generally acts contrary to reasonable commercial standards when
it violates either its own manual of operation or policies promul-
gated by such organizations as The American Institute of Banking
or Banking Administration Institute. These organizations hold
that it is a violation of sound banking practice to allow checks
made payable to a corporation to be endorsed and paid into the
account of an individual or other separate entity, unless done in
accordance with specific authority or resolution.6 1 Most courts,
however, will refuse to hold that the bank has violated reasonable
commercial standards as a matter of law for such an infraction,
leaving the issue to be decided in the context of specific facts. 62
4. Failure to inquire into suspicious circumstances
A drawee of depositary bank must also act according to reason-
able commercial standards when unusual or suspicious circum-
stances arise. In Twellman v. Lindell Trust Company, 63 the bank
which issued a cashier's check was held not to have followed rea-
sonable commercial standards in paying an item on which the en-
When a bank receives checks made payable to itself, and the bank is not a creditor
of the drawer, it is charged with knowledge that the check has "commercial signifi-
cance" and will be negligent in disbursing money to the drawer's agent without
receiving "proper instructions" or making any inquiry as to the drawer's intended
purpose for the check; see Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 21
N.Y.2d 428, 235 N.E.2d 756 (1968).
59. 500 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App., 1973).
60. Id. at 908.
61. Empire Moving and Warehouse Corp. v. Hyde Park Bank and Trust Co., 43
Ill. App. 3d 991, 357 N.E.2d 1196 (1976). The court held that the corporate
despositor was entitled to summary judgment.
62. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414, 595
P.2d 206 (1979); Trust Company of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A. v. Port Termi-
nal and Warehousing Co., 153 Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1980).
63. 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App. 1976).
dorsement was "patently irregular."64 The court noted that the
endorsement did not have to be in exactly the same form as the
named payee, so long as "there was nothing on the face of the in-
strument to arouse the suspicion of the bank. . .such as an obvi-
ous irregularity" with respect to the endorsement. Here the
check was made payable to "International Harvester," but had
been endorsed: "Pay to the order of [Individual's name] - Rodell
Bros. International (sic) [,I Harvester Trucks (signed) Carle (sic)
Roedel. '65 Similarly, in Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters
Trust Co., 66 the court held that a drawee bank could be charged
with negligence for paying out funds when "the physical appear-
ance of the signature ... considered together with the suspicious
appearance [of accompanying documents] . . .and the exception-
ally large amount of the check in relation to the usual pattern" in-
dicated fraud or lack of authority.
Any fact may become relevant in determining whether the bank
has acted according to reasonable commercial standards. For ex-
ample, one court has held that where a bank permitted an em-
ployee of its largest customer to endorse an instrument in the
name of known suppliers of the customer and to deposit the pro-
ceeds in a newly created account, the permission evidenced a fail-
ure to exercise reasonable procedures. 67 In Mortimer, the court
emphasized that the branch was small, with only a few employ-
ees; moreover, the drawer's account was the largest in the bank
and its operations were familiar to the bank employees. Negli-
gence was also attributed to the drawee bank in Jackson v. First
National Bank of Memphis, 68 for cashing a check in favor of one
of the two authorized signatories for the drawer, a church. The
drawee bank should have been put on inquiry as to whether or
not the funds were being withdrawn for unauthorized purposes.
5. "Reasonable" vs. "common" banking standards
Code section 3-406 requires that the bank prove more than that
its procedures were "common among banks."69 The bank must
64. Id. at 91.
65. Id.
66. 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78-9 (1973).
67. Titan Air Conditioning Corp et al., v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 A.D.2d
764, 462 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1978).
68. 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966). Another case finding banks to
have been negligent for failure to react to "suspicious circumstances" is Em-
ployer's Liab. Assurance Corp. Ltd. of London, England v. Hudson River Trust Co.,
250 A.D. 159, 294 N.Y.S. 698 (1937) (failure to inquire as to county check for sub-
stantial amount made payable to county treasurer).
69. U.C.C. § 3-406(b).
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also show that such procedures were "reasonable. ' ' 70 In Perley v.
Glastonbury Bank and Trust Company,71 the depositary bank
made no effort to verify the endorsement signatures, but instead
introduced evidence that it was customary bank procedure to ac-
cept such a check as presented without authenticating the en-
dorsements and to rely on its ability to charge the account of the
payee if the endorsements proved invalid. The court responded:
Such procedure may well be common among banks, but the defendants
[drawee and depositary banks] failed to show that such conduct is rea-
sonable. An examination of signature cards to determine the genuineness
of endorsements may not be entirely practical under modern banking
methods, but we do not feel that that necessarily relieves banks of the risk
of loss on forged checks.
7 2
C. The Problem of Causation
Cases decided under common law and the NIL established that
a party was precluded from claiming reimbusement for forged or
altered instruments only when his negligent actions were the di-
rect and proximate cause of the forgery.7 3 Furthermore, such neg-
ligence was not to be considered the proximate cause of the loss
unless it actually misled the payor.74 Thus, absent the payor's re-
liance on the negligent acts, mere negligence or laxity in business
affairs was held not to preclude either the drawer's action for im-
proper payment or defense against a HIDC.75 Given this pre-Code
case law, the question has arisen whether U.C.C. section 3-406 evi-
dences an intent to adopt a different test of causation.76 Specifi-
cally, is negligence which substantially contributes to a forgery or
material alteration of an instrument different from negligence
which proximately causes the loss?
Although several courts have stated that they consider section
3-406 not to have changed the law concerning causation,7 7 the ma-
70. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Hovey, 412 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980); See also, Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 446 (1949).
71. 170 Conn. 691, 368 A.2d 149 (1976).
72. 170 Conn. at 703, 368 A.2d at 155.
73. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 641, 647 (1955); Arant, Forged Checks -
The Duty of the Depositor to His Bank, 31 Yale L.J. 598 (1922); BEUTEL, BRANNON'S
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 23 at 455 (7th ed. 1948).
74. I.e., an "estoppel"; see Union Trust Company v. Soble, 192 Md. 427, 64 A.2d
744 (1949).
75. Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 641, 645 (1955).
76. 6 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, W. WILLIER & F. HART, U.C.C. REPORTER-DI-
GEST, § 3-406 (1981) (hereinafter cited as WILLIER & HART).
77. Society Nat'l Bank v. Capitol Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 1, 281 N.E.2d 563
jority of decisions applying this section have barred a claim of for-
gery or material alteration if the claimant's negligence
substantially contributed to the forgery or alteration. 78 Likewise,
the weight of scholarly opinion supports the view that the phrase
"substantially contributes to", as used in section 3-406, means
nothing more than cause-in-fact, the sole issue being whether the
negligence was a substantial factor (the Restatement test) 79 in
the making of either an unauthorized signature or a material al-
teration.80 This view has been said to include negligent conduct
on the part of the drawer of a check which would have been too
remote under the proximate cause standard of causation.8 1
Therefore, the question of causation under section 3-406 becomes
a relatively simple factual inquiry. The more difficult policy de-
terminations as to whether a duty existed can be formulated by
the courts or legislatures, rather than being subsumed in the
amorphous concept of proximate cause.82
D. Nature and Degree of Negligence
1. Ordinary or extraordinary
At one time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believed that a
finding of more than ordinary negligence was necessary under
section 3-406 to preclude a claim for improper payment. 83 Appar-
ently, the Court thought that the term "substantially" called for a
higher degree of negligence rather than simply acting to modify
the concept of causation.84 However, this view has been univer-
sally rejected by other courts85 and appears to have been aban-
(1972); East Gadsden Bank v. City Nat'l. Bank, 50 Ala. App. 576, 281 So.2d 431
(1973); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Ten. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1926); Jerman
v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assn., 7 Cal. App. 3d 882, 87 Cal. Rptr. 28
(1970); Maddox v. First Westroads Bank, 199 Neb. 81, 256 N.W.2d 647 (1977).
78. See supra note 76, at 2-958.4; Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 144 § II[d].
79. The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if [:]
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b)
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the
manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 431 (1965).
80. George Whalley Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App. 2d
205, 380 N.E.2d 742 (1977); W. WILLAER & F. HART, supra note 76, at § 3-406; U.C.C.
Brief No. 13, supra note 47, at 76.
81. Dominion Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'l. Bank of Maryland, 271 Md. 154, 315
A.2d 69, 74 (1974).
82. For a good criticism of "proximate cause", see Green, Proximate Cause in
Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1950).
83. National Bank and Trust Co. of Central Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 9
Commonw. of Pa. 358, 305 A.2d 769 (1973).
84. Cf., George Walley Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App. 2d
205, 380 N.E.2d 742 (1977); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492
P.2d 534 (1972).
85. Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 144, 155-56 (1975).
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doned in Pennsylvania as well.8 6 The prevailing view is that
negligence in section 3-406 means: "Failure to exercise 'reason-
able' or 'ordinary care', and that means the care which 'the ordi-
nary prudent person' under the circumstances would exercise."8 7
2. Hiring and supervising a clerk/bookkeeper
Most pre-Code and U.C.C. decisions have recognized an affirma-
tive duty on the part of the banking institution to hire honest em-
ployees and to supervise their handling of commercial paper.88
For example, it has been held to constitute evidence of negligence
to employ a known gambler in a position in which false loan ap-
plications could be submitted by him to his employer, the
drawer.89 Additionally, the failure of a drawer to conduct an in-
vestigation of his accountant's credentials and background, fol-
lowed by the hiring of the employee based solely upon the
recommendation of a single individual, was held to be evidence of
negligence under section 3-406.
A number of factors may determine the scope of the employer's
duty to supervise their accounting employees and accounting em-
ployment practices. These relate to the nature of the employer's
business, i.e., its size, its compliance with accepted business prac-
tices for investigating employees, and the amount of the checks
written or received by the particular business. 90 Other relevant
factors might involve the particular employee, his background
and references, his financial status, the quality of his perform-
ance, the scope of his responsibility, and prior work history. For
example, one case held that twenty years of faithful service given
86. See Commonwealth v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Central Penn-
sylvania, 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976), where the court noted that "[i]t is
no longer open to question that the term 'negligence' as used in § 3-406, means the
failure to exercise ordinary care" (citation omitted). Id.
87. Perley v. Glastonbury, 170 Conn. at 695, 368 A.2d at 153; see also Fidelity
and Casualty Co. of New York v. Constitution Nat'l Bank, 167 Conn. 478, 356 A.2d
117 (1975); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 3d 144 (1975); W. WILIER & F. HART, supra note 76, at
§ 3-406.
88. See Annot., 67 A.LR.3d 144, 169 (1975).
89. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 55 F.R.D. 436
(E.D.Wis. 1972); Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972), vacated 9 Cal. 3d 371 (1973).
90. See George Whaliey Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App.
2d 205, 380 N.E.2d 742 (1977); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492
P.2d 534 (1972).
by an employee may justify the employer in lowering his guard.9 1
Even long-term employees, however, may not go completely
unwatched.92
Courts have also imposed a duty on the part of most businesses
to conduct a periodic audit of sufficient thoroughness to catch the
more obvious defalcations.93 Also, employers have a duty to in-
vestigate the possibility of employee misuse of checks whenever
suspicious circumstances occur, such as dramatically rising pro-
duction costs, 94 sudden spending by a previously penurious em-
ployee, 95 or missing records. 96
3. Safeguarding checkbooks and check signing apparatus
A bank customer must take reasonable measures such as a
"Protectograph," facsimile signature stamp, or signing machine,
to prevent unauthorized use of his checkbook and signing equip-
ment. 97 What constitutes reasonable measures depends, of
course, upon the circumstances. In one case, the owner of a bar-
ber shop was held to be negligent for leaving blank checks in an
unlocked drawer easily accessible to the faithless employee.98
The normal procedure of the shop was that the checks were
signed by hand, thus the employee was provided with the entire
opportunity he needed to consummate the forgery. Yet, in Fred
Mayer, Inc. v. Temco Metal Products Co.,99 the court rejected the
argument that the company was negligent in failing to keep its
blank checks in safekeeping, or in failing to lock the "Protecto-
graph" so as to render it unusable. The forgers, who were bur-
glars, reached the checks and signing apparatus only after going
through a skylight, kicking open the office door, and evading the
owner's security service. In short, this case did not fall within the
rule that one may be negligent for creating a situation that might
91. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109
(1966).
92. See, e.g., Ashley-Hall Ind., Ltd., Inc. v. Bank of New Orleans, 389 So. 2d 850
(La. App. 1980); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492 P.2d 534
(1972).
93. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 34, 32
P.2d 268 (Colo. 1934); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and Home Say.
Bank, 233 N.W. 185 (Mich. 1930).
94. See Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 233 N.W.
185 (Mich. 1930).
95. Corbett v. Kleinsmith, 112 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1940); Scott v. First Nat'l Bank,
343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938).
96. Westport Bank and Trust Co. v. Lodge, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 450 (Conn.
1973); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash 2d 157, 492 P.2d 534 (1972).
97. U.C.C. § 3-406(7); see also Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 144, 173 (1975).
98. Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492 P.2d 534 (1972).
99. 267 Or. 230, 516 P.2d 80 (1973).
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afford a third person an opportunity to commit a crime or tort.100
4. Issuing the instrument, signing, and endorsing
Generally, a party is precluded from denying liability on an in-
strument where the forgery or alteration was facilitated by the
form in which the instrument was drawn.101 Phrased in terms of
a duty, a party must exercise reasonable care in the execution of
an instrument so as to discourage a forgery or alteration.
Uniform Commercial Code section 3-406, comment b, states that
"[n] egligence usually has been found where spaces are left in the
body of the instrument in which words or figures may be in-
serted."10 2 A typical case is where an individual allows the payee
to write the amount of the check, squeezed far to the right, and
then signs the check, thus allowing the payee to easily raise the
amount without a reasonable possibility of detection. 0 3 However,
leaving a space to the right of the amount line does not necessar-
ily constitute negligence as a matter of law. A Texas court found
an absence of negligence when a woman signed a check prepared
by her son-in-law in this fashion.104 Conversely, a Florida court
held negligent an employer who signed a paycheck drawn with
spaces and left it for signature by the employee-payee. 0 5 In
other words, the degree of commercial sophistication of the
drawer and his relationship to the payee are relevant factors in
determining what constitutes negligence.
Improperly filling in the name of the payee is another common
check writing hazard. It is questionable whether the drawer has a
duty to fill in blank spaces after written designation of the named
payee so as to prevent the addition on the instrument of an alter-
nate payee who could singularly endorse and cash the instru-
ment. 0 6 However, if the drawer intends to name joint payees,
both of whom are to endorse, the instrument must clearly show
that they are separate entities on the face of the check. Other-
100. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 4 (1965).
101. Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1139(I), (III) (1923); 67 A.L.R.3d 144, at 151-52 (1975).
102. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 3.
103. See, e.g., Williams v. Montana Nat'l Bank of Bozeman, 167 Mont. 24, 534
P.2d 1247 (1975). Leonard Nat'l Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 267,
145 S.E.2d 23 (1965).
104. Glasscock v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924); see also Ray
v. Farmers State Bank of Hart, 576 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1979).
105. Goldsmith v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 55 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1951).
106. See, e.g., Gutfreund v. E. River Nat'l Bank, 167 N.E. 171 (1929).
wise the drawer may be held negligent when one payee endorses
both names, representing to the bank that the two payees were in
fact a single entity under which name the wrongdoer was doing
business. 07 Furthermore, if checks are intended for the benefit of
a particular party, but are made payable to a named bank, such
practice may facilitate the endorsement and deposit to the ac-
count of a wrongdoer unless the check and accompanying docu-
ments indicate the specific pupose and intended beneficiary of
the check.108
5. Delivery of the instrument
Comment 7 to section 3-406 states that the section is intended to
preclude recovery "where a check is negligently mailed to the
wrong person having the same name as the payee." Although this
type of negligent delivery can occur, and has in fact occurred,109
more difficult questions are presented when the drawer entrusts
the instrument to a non-payee for the purpose of delivery to the
intended payee.110
A principle which can be distilled from the delivery cases is
that the drawer may entrust the instrument to a non-payee for de-
livery to the intended payee, provided there are no reasonable
grounds for suspicion of potential misappropriation, forgery, or al-
teration of the instrument."' In other words, the drawer is not re-
quired to anticipate a forgery or alteration of the instrument, but
cannot put his "head in the sand" if there is cause to suspect that
this might occur.12
A corollary to this principle is that where business or trade
rules apply regarding delivery of negotiable instruments, the
drawer will in most cases be found negligent if a failure to follow
these rules "substantially contributes to" the forgery or altera-
tion. For example, in Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 113 the stockbroker-drawer
107. Dominion Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 271 Md. 154, 315
A.2d 69 (1975).
108. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Sioux Falls v. Union Bank and Trust, 291
N.W.2d 282 (S.D. 1980).
109. Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 2d 235, 207 N.E.2d
158 (1965).
110. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 144 §9 (1975).
111. Two cases following this principle are Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 454 F. Supp. 488, 491 (W.D. Okla. 1977);
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Chemical Bank, 47 A.D.2d 608, 363 N.Y.S.2d 820
(App. Div. 1975).
112. See, e.g., Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976).
113. 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. Div. 1970), affirmed, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726
(1972).
18
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was found negligent for delivering checks to an attorney who mis-
represented his status as agent of the stock owners. The stock-
broker-drawer's failure to verify the attorney's authority was a
violation of the New York Stock Exchange "Know Your Cus-
tomer" rule. However, in a widely discussed case,114 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 115 on facts remarkably similar to those in Fidelity
and Deposit, reached a different result. Interestingly, although
the Bagby court agreed that the section 3-406 test for causation
was the equivalent of the Restatement "substantial factor" test, it
nevertheless found that the drawer's admitted failure to follow
the "Know Your Customer" rule contributed only to the issuance
of the check, rather than to the forgery. The court thus followed
what was essentially a "proximate cause" rationale. Apparently,
the Bagby court made a policy determination that negligent deliv-
ery of an instrument - even in violation of the drawer's rules -
should not preclude a drawer from asserting forgery as a defense.
The case has been generally criticized as a result.
6. Review of bank statements and cancelled checks
The depositor's duty to review his bank statements and can-
celled checks to detect forgeries and alterations is specifically re-
quired by section 4-406 and is discussed below." 6 Suffice it here
to say that cases decided under section 3-406 have also recognized
a depositor's duty to exercise reasonable care and promptness in
reviewing bank statements and cancelled checks."17 Accordingly,
a depositor's failure in this respect will preclude him from claim-
ing improper payment due to forgery or alteration."i8
114. See generally, W. WILLIER, & F. HART, supra note 76.
115. 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974).
116. See generally, W. WMLIER & F. HART, supra note 76, at § 3-406; see also
Whaley, supra note 32 at 22.
117. See, e.g., Myrick v. National Say. and Trust Co., 268 A.2d 526 (Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Ashley-Hall Interiors, Ltd., Inc. v. Bank of New Orleans, 389 So. 2d 850 (La.
App. 1980).
118. Certain distinctions and overlaps between the coverage of U.C.C. § 3-406,
and U.C.C. § 4-406 are discussed in §IV, infra.
III. NEGLIGENCE IN DETECTING FORGERIES AND MATERIAL
ALTERATIONS: U.C.C. SECTION 4-406.
A. Overview
U.C.C. section 4-406(1) provides that after the bank makes the
cancelled checks and statement available, the customer "must ex-
ercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement
and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration
on an item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery
thereof." If the customer fails in these duties with respect to any
single item, he is precluded from claiming forgery or alteration:
a.) With respect to that item, if the bank suffers a loss as a re-
sult;119 and b.) with respect to any subsequent item (until the
bank is notified) which is forged or altered by the same wrong-
doer after a reasonable period of time (not to exceed fourteen
days) from the time that the first such item and statement was
made available to the customer.120
However, even if the customer is negligent and fails to give the
required notice, the customer may still claim improper payment
of forged or altered items if he "establishes [a] lack of ordinary
care, on the part of the bank in paying the item[ s].1"121
B. The Customer's Duties and Responsibilities
1. Generally
The customer's duty to "exercise reasonable care and prompt-
ness" in examining his statement and cancelled checks is not de-
fined in the Code. In fact, there are relatively few cases which
have dealt with this duty. Pre-Code cases held, as a minimum,
that the customer's reconciliation procedure should include the
following steps:
a.) A comparison of the cancelled checks with the check stubs;
b.) A comparison of the statement balance with the checkbook balance;
and
c.) A comparison of the returned checks with the debits indicated on the
statement.
1 2 2
What constitutes "reasonable care" under section 4-406 is, of
119. U.C.C. § 4-406(2) (a).
120. U.C.C. § 4-406(2) (b).
121. U.C.C. § 4-406(3).
122. See generally Stumpp v. Bank of New York, 212 A.D. 608, 209 N.Y.S. 396, 402
(1925); Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 111, 138
N.W.2d 157, 161 (1965); Clarck v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762,
766 (1964); 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks §§ 512, 569, 604; Comment, Allocation of Losses
from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the U.C.C.,
YALE L. J. 417, 449 (1953); Penny, Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks and Article 4
in the Electronic Age, 65 MicH L. REV. 1341, 1349 (1967).
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course, a question of fact, although there are relatively few rules.
The depositor is not immediately required to examine checks for
forgeries of endorsements.123 However, as a practical matter the
customer should do so, since after three years, without regard to
reasonable care, he will be absolutely barred from claiming im-
proper payment on a forged endorsement. 24 Moreover, one writer
has suggested that although a duty to examine for forged en-
dorsements may not exist under section 4-406(1), it may, perhaps,
arise under section 3-406.125
As is the case with "reasonable care," there is no Code defini-
tion of what constitutes "promptness" or "reasonable time." One
case has held that these standards generally create questions of
fact which "can only be answered by taking into consideration the
circumstances of the particular case."1 26
2. Customer's reponsibility for dishonest employees
The classic scenario of forged or altered check cases is the
faithless bookkeeper who attempts to cover his trail by either
withholding the depositor's monthly statement and cancelled
checks or submitting the statement and checks to the depositor
after having removed the forged or altered items. The question
often presented is, what effect, if any, such cover-up efforts have
on the depositor's duties under section 4-406. Although the Code
gives no clear answer to the question,127 the cases decided since
the Code was adopted clearly state the applicable principles.
First, the fact that the depositor's employee attempts to conceal
123. Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank of Whitefish Bay, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 299 N.W.2d
829 (1981); Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. Ct. 373, 406 A.2d 494,
500 (1979). However, Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 4-406 provides that "nothing in this
section is intended to affect any decision holding that a customer who has notice
of something wrong with an endorsement must exercise reasonable care to inves-
tigate and notify the bank". Id.
124. U.C.C. § 4-406(4); see infra § V and accompanying discussion.
125. See Whaley, supra note 32, at 37. This would be particularly so where
there were continuing forged signatures, and the customer's negligence "substan-
tially contributing" to the subsequent forgeries. Id.
126. Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super Ct. 373, 406 A.2d 494
(1979).
127. Pre-Code cases gave varying responses to these question ranging from the
notion that if the depositor used ordinary care in the selection of his employees,
he had fulfilled his duty to the bank, Kenneth Inv. Co. v. National Bank, 103 Mo.
613, 77 S.W. 1002 (1903), to the view that the guilty knowledge of the employee was
imputed to the employer, see generally Annot., 15 A.LR. 159; 36 A.L.R. 327 (1925);
67 A.L.R. 72 (1930); 103 A.L.R. 1147 (1936).
the forgery "does not obviate the customer's responsibility to ex-
amine his own bank statement."128 Secondly, the majority and
better reasoned view as to this imputation of knowledge is that
the depositor-employer is charged only with notice of what would
have been disclosed had an "honest employee" reconciled the
bank statement and book. "[T] he employer, though not imputed
with knowledge of the fraud of his faithless agent, is, as principal,
chargeable with such information as an honest employee, una-
ware of the wrongdoing, would have acquired from the examina-
tion of the cancelled checks and bank statements."129
The question yet to be answered is what effect an exceptionally
skilled cover-up by the bookkeeper will have on the depositor's
duties under section 4-406. The principle quoted above implies
that if the cover-up is so skillful that it would fool the hypotheti-
cal "honest employee," then the employer-depositor would, to
that extent, be excused from his duty of reporting the fraud to the
bank.
3. Customer's duty to conduct periodic audits: duty to inquire
Although the facts of each case would control, at least one court
has found evidence of negligence on the part of a depositor-
drawer for failing to perform regular audits of its business.130
Also, if the depositor has not received statements of cancelled
checks from the bank, the burden seems to be on him to inquire
as to the reasons why.131
4. Bank's burden of proof
Section 4-406(2) places a dual burden of proof on the bank to:
1.) establish that the customer failed to "exercise reasonable care
and promptness" in examining the statement and enclosed items;
and 2.) prove that the bank "suffered a loss" by reason of such
failure.132 It has been held that the bank "suffers a loss" within
the meaning of this section whenever it pays an item which can-
not be charged to the customer because the bank was not notified
128. Kiernan v. Union Bank, 55 Cal. App. 3d 111, 127 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1976); Pine
Bluff Nat'l Bank v. Kesterson, 257 Ark. 813, 822, 520 S.W.2d 253, 258 (1975).
129. Kiernan v. Union Bank, 55 Cal. App. 3d 111, 127 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1976); see
also George Whalley Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App. 2d 205,
380 N.E.2d 742 (1977); In re Parry Lines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 693, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Clark v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762 (1964). See also 10 AM.
JuR. 2d Banks, § 514, at 483-84 (1963).
130. Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. FACO, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. App. 1980).
131. See Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 157, 492 P.2d 534 (1972).
132. U.C.C. § 4-406(2) (a).
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in time to avoid the loss.'
3 3
Apparently, the bank does not have to show a "loss" with re-
spect to subsequent items forged by the same wrongdoer after
the first such item is made available to the customer. The official
comments to section 4-406 state that payment of additional forged
or altered items to the same wrongdoer is a "loss suffered by the
bank" due to the customer's negligence in allowing the wrongdoer
to repeat his misdeeds.134
C. Bank's Duty to Act with "Ordinary Care"
1. Generally
U.C.C. section 4-406(3) provides that "[tihe preclusion under
subsection (2) does not apply if the customer established lack of
ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s)." This
section essentially states that if the bank fails to use ordinary
care it always bears the loss, whether or not the customer was
negligent, presumably without regard to the degree of the cus-
tomer's negligence.135 Not surprisingly, the question of whether
the bank exercised ordinary care with regard to "a particular situ-
ation or combination of circumstances" is decided by the trier of
fact. 13 6
The Code does not define the term "ordinary care" under sec-
tion 4-406(3); however, it does state that certain practices are
deemed either absolutely or prima facie to constitute ordinary
care:
Action or non-action approved by [Article 4] or pursuant to Federal Re-
serve regulations or operating letters constitutes the exercise of ordinary
care and, in the absence of special instructions, action or non-action con-
133. Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank of Whitefish Bay, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 299 N.W.2d
829 (1981).
134. U.C.C. § 4-406, comment 3.
135. Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F Supp. 501, 504 (D. Kan.
1979); see also Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). This responsibility is possibly justified by the conception
that "a bank ... is equipped to discover forgeries and to safely preserve its depos-
itor's money. The bank holds out to the public that its offices and agents are
skilled in all matters connected with and relating to its ability to detect and pre-
vent forgeries". Union Wholesale Co. v. Bank of Delaware, 55 Del. 223, 243, 190
A.2d 761, 771 (1963), quoting Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co., v. First Nat'l Bank, 166
Miss. 162, 146 So. 116, 120 (1933).
136. Hanover Ins. Co's v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 at 506 (D.
Kan. 1979); Exch. Bank and Trust Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971). See also Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 55 Tenn. App.
545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966).
sistent with clearing house rules and the like or with a general banking
usage not disapproved of by this Article, primafacie constitutes the exer-
cise of ordinary care. 137
The most frequently litigated issues concern whether certain
"general banking usages" or practices, i.e., not verifying the valid-
ity of signatures, constitute "ordinary care." The short answer to
this problem is, "not necessarily." In Hanover Insurance Com-
pany v. Brotherhood State Bank, 138 the bank introduced evidence
to establish that the payees' identities were not normally investi-
gated if the checks were for small amounts, in accordance with
"the standards of local banking usage." The district court recog-
nized that "local banking practices may be useful in determining
the standard of ordinary care required by [U.C.C. §4-406(3)]",
but, nevertheless, do not automatically exonerate the bank. The
court stated that "No matter what minimal standards are sug-
gested by local banking usage, [such usage] cannot amend the
statutory requirement of ordinary care ..... 'Even an entire in-
dustry, by adopting such careless methods to save time, effort or
money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled stan-
dard.' "139 Similarly, an Alabama court held that evidence of ac-
tion pursuant to "common banking standards" must also be
shown not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair."140 There-
fore, even though a bank may introduce evidence that it is "not
practical under modern banking methods" to examine each signa-
ture, it "cannot escape the consequences" when a signature turns
out to be forged.' 41 This does not mean that the bank has a duty
to hire additional employees to examine checks, but it does mean
that the bank must assume the risk of such business decisions. 42
2. Proof of the lack of ordinary care
Typically, proof of the bank's lack of ordinary care will be of
two types; either that the bank's procedures were below the stan-
dard, or that the bank's employees failed to exercise ordinary
care in processing the particular items.
To illustrate the first type of negligence, the bank's "system"
may be measured against either general modern banking proce-
dures or the generally accepted banking practice in the area, as
137. U.C.C. § 4-103(3).
138. 482 F. Supp. 501 (D.Kans. 1979).
139. 482 F. Supp. at 506; see also PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 167 (4th ed. 1971).
140. Industrial Sys. of Huntsville, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 376 So.
2d 742, 745 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
141. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109
(1966).
142. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 510 (D.Kan.
1979).
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evidenced by expert testimony. 43 Where the only evidence
presented is a description of procedures followed by the particu-
lar bank, the bank's system must be measured by a judicial con-
ception of reasonableness. 4 4 Under either approach, examples of
relevant evidence include the instructions and training given to
employees for detecting forgeries or alterations,145 the number of
persons performing a visual examination of the checks in ques-
tion,146 whether each check is compared to a signature card or
simply to the clerk's "mental image" of the signature,147 and how
many checks a single clerk handles each day.' 48
The more likely attack against the bank will be to show the
bank employee's negligence in paying a forged or altered check
which a competent teller or clerk should have noticed. 49 Proof
on this question normally requires putting the checks into evi-
dence, together with the signature card, and an effort to get the
employee who examined the checks to admit that some of them
ought not to have been paid. However, a bank clerk "cannot be
held to a degree of expertness of a handwriting expert ... for the
standard is that of ordinary care."' 50 So, the bank may counter
this attack by calling a handwriting expert to testify that the
143. Nu-Way Services, Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 530 S.W.2d 743,
746-747 (Mo. App. 1975); see also Basch v. Bank of Am., 22 Cal. 2d 16, 139 P.2d 1
(1943); 13 Am. JUR. 2d, Proof of Facts §§ 4-6, at 354-360 (1977).
144. Industrial Sys. of Huntsville, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 376
So. 2d 742, 745 Ala. Civ. App. 1979). See supra note 135, at 745.
145. For example, in Clyman v. Marks, 39 Misc. 2d 198, 204, 240 N.Y.S.2d 532, 538
(1963), a pre-Code case, the court noted that "some modicum" of training must be
given to tellers, so they can at least recognize an "obvious" discrepancy in signa-
tures; see also First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d
542 (1973).
146. Screenland Magazine v. National City Bank, 181 Misc. 454, 42 N.Y.S.2d 286,
290 (1943).
147. At least two cases have held that it is acceptable for clerks to examine sig-
nature cards until they are familiar with the authentic signatures, then to examine
the signatures on the checks without actual reference to the signature cards. Nu-
Way Serv., Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co., Nat'l Ass'n, 50 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. App. 1975);
Huber Glass Co., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 111, 138
N.W.2d 157, 161 (1965).
148. Nu-Way Services, Inc. v. Merchantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 530 S.W.2d 743,
746-747; see also Exchange Bank and Trust v. Tidwell Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super.
304, 201 A.2d 762 (1964).
149. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Melbourne v. Sogaard and Debo, Inc., 406 F.2d
1128 (5th Cir. 1969).
150. "Reasonable care" on the part of the bank does not call for "expertness"
on the part of its tellers, but it does call for prudence. Clyman v. Marks, 39 Misc.
2d 198; see also, Industrial Sys. of Huntsville, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank of Hunts-
ville, 376 So. 2d 742 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
checks are such excellent forgeries that even an expert teller or
bookkeeper could not have detected them.' 5 ' It has been held
that such testimony cannot be deemed expert, unless the witness
himself is a banker, or one qualified to testify as to what a knowl-
edgeable, experienced and careful teller would be able to discover
under normal banking conditions.152
3. Application to particular practices
One might suppose that the term "reasonable commercial stan-
dards" as used in section 3-406 requires something more or less
than "ordinary care" under section 4-406(3);153 however, most
courts have made no distinction between these standards in ap-
plying them to banks.154 Consequently, the cases dealing with
whether a bank has acted according to "reasonable commercial
standards" under section 3-406 would be relevant authority
here.155
Two recent cases, however, have dealt with the bank's duty to
exercise "ordinary care" under section 4-406(3) without mention
of section 3-406.156 In both cases, the court held that a drawee
bank had a duty not only to check the validity of the drawer's sig-
nature, but also a duty to inquire into the validity of the payee's
endorsement as well. For example, in Hanover, the payee's name
had been stricken in a "conspicuous and maladroit" fashion, and
the name of the faithless employee was substituted who endorsed
the check. The court noted that "the substantial amounts of the
checks involved ... and the ease with which a telephone call
could have confirmed the payee" are factors which showed a lack
of ordinary care on the part of the banks.157
4. Burden of proof as to the bank's duty
U.C.C. section 4-406(3) completely reversed the common law
151. Ashley-Hall Interiors, Ltd., Inc. v. Bank of New Orleans, 389 So. 2d 850 (La.
App. 1980).
152. See, e.g., Thoreson v. Citizens State Bank, 294 N.W.2d 397, 401 (N.D. 1980);
Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943);
Kimball v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 (1946).
153. See infra § IV and accompanying discussion.
154. See, e.g., Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W. 2d
465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 55 Tenn. App.
545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966); Ashley-Hall Interiors, Ltd., Inc. v. Bank of New Orleans,
389 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 1980).
155. See supra § IIB and accompanying discussion.
156. Hanover Ins. Co's. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 504 (D.Kan.
1979); See also Thoreson v. Citizens State Bank, 294 N.W.2d 397, 401 (N.D. 1980).
157. 482 F. Supp. 501, 505. But see Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d
609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
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rule;l58 thus, the burden of proof with respect to the bank's negli-
gence is now placed on the customer, rather than requiring the
bank to demonstrate its freedom from negligence.159 The Code
comments state that this "redistribution" of the burden of proof
was to provide "reasonable equality of treatment" as between the
bank and the customer, rather than requiring one party, i.e., the
bank, "to establish that his entire course of conduct constituted
ordinary care."160 If this is so, one can only wonder why the bank
is saddled with proving that its "entire course of conduct" was in
accordance with "reasonable commercial standards" under U.C.C.
section 3-406.
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.C.C. SECTION 3-406 AND U.C.C.
SECTION 4-406.
A. Similarities and Differences
Code sections 3-406 and 4-406 are related, yet also dissimilar, in
several repects which can lead to some confusion. Both sections
preclude the customer from claiming against the bank if the cus-
tomer's negligence in detecting the forgery or alteration resulted
in delayed notice to the bank.161 Also, both sections provide that
negligence on the part of the bank excuses the negligence of the
customer. However, the two sections are substantially different in
the following respects:
1.) U.C.C. section 4-406 deals strictly with the relationship be-
tween a customer and his bank,162 whereas section 3-406 can pre-
clude other parties, such as a negligent payee, from claiming
against a bank.
2.) U.C.C. section 3-406 deals primarily with a customer's neg-
ligence prior to the forgery or alteration, whereas section 4-406
deals with the customer's negligence after the forged or altered
check is paid by the bank. However, as noted above, the cus-
158. The burden of proof is on the bank to an absence of negligence; see Kim-
ball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 (1946).
159. See, e.g., Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 111, 138 N.W.2d
157, 161 (1965).
160. U.C.C. § 4-406, comment 4.
161. See supra § IID(6) and accompanying discussion.
162. However, in Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d
920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978), it was held that a depositary bank, when sued in a
direct action by the drawer, may raise the defense that the drawer failed to give
notice to its drawee bank as required by U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
tomer's negligence in failing to detect the first forgery after the
fact by, failing to examine bank statements and checks, may con-
tribute to the making of subsequent forgeries by the same wrong-
doer under section 3-406.
3.) Although the customer may have no duty to check for forged
or altered endorsement under U.C.C. section 4-406, there is, argua-
bly, a duty to do so under section 3-406.163
4.) The standard of care required of the bank is phrased in
terms of "reasonable commercial standards" under U.C.C. section
3-406 and "ordinary care" under section 4-406(3).
B. "Reasonable Commercial Standards" or "Ordinary Care"
It has been argued that the phrase "reasonable commercial
standards" under section 3-406 was intended to require a dissimi-
lar degree of care than the "ordinary care" required by banks
under section 4-406(3).164 It is more likely, however, that the
drafters intended "reasonable commercial standards" to be sub-
stantially the same as the "ordinary care" standard. Official Com-
ment 6 to section 3-406 implies this when it states: "[Section 3-
406] protects parties who act... in observance of the reasonable
standards of their business. Thus, any bank which takes or pays
an altered check which ordinary banking standards would re-
quire it to refuse cannot take advantage of the estoppel."165 The
use of different terms, as applied to banks, could be attributed to
the fact that Article 3 deals with more than banking practices, and
the drafters did not intend to impose general commercial stan-
dards of banks already bound by the specific requirements of Ar-
ticle 4. Moreover, banks may have greater flexibility under the
standards relating to "their business". Consider U.C.C. section 4-
103(4) which states: "The specification or approval of certain pro-
cedures by this Article does not constitute disapproval of other
procedures which may be redsonable under the circumstances."
There is no Article 4 provision comparable to section 3-406, which
appears to require non-bank commercial enterprises to prove the
notoriety of the particular practice in question. Finally, as noted
earlier, the cases applying section 3-406 and section 4-406 stan-
dards of care to banking practices do not seem to draw a material
distinction between the two.
163. Whaley, supra note 32, at 37, n.136.
164. Comment, Forgeries and Material Alterations: Allocation of Risks Under
the U.C.C., 50 B.U.L. REv. 536 (1970).
165. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 6'(emphasis added).
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C. Burdens of Proof
Both sections 3-406 and 4-406 require the bank to prove the cus-
tomer's negligence. Under section 3-406 the bank must, in addi-
tion, prove that it acted according to "reasonable commercial
standards," whereas under section 4-406(3) this is not so. Rather,
the customer, in order to avoid a claim of section 4-406(1) negli-
gence, must shoulder the burden of proving that the bank did not
act with "ordinary care."
An interesting dilemma thus arises when both section 3-406 and
section 4-406 are at issue in the same case. For example, a bank
may seek to show that its customer was negligent in contributing
to a forgery under section 3-406 and in failing to detect the forgery
under section 4-406(1). This showing would not be difficult since
the bank has the burden of proof under both Code sections. How-
ever, the customer, in an effort to avoid the effect of its alleged
negligence, may charge that the bank was negligent in paying out
funds without verifying signatures. Under section 3-406, the bank
must prove that it paid the funds according to the "reasonable
commercial standards" of the banking business. Under section 4-
406, however, the customer has the burden of proving the oppo-
site. What should the result be when such a conflict between
U.C.C. provisions occurs?
First, since the bank's own negligence will excuse the cus-
tomer's negligence under both Code sections, that issue should be
determined before addressing the issue of the customer's negli-
gence. Second, it would seem that a determination of the bank's
negligence under section 3-406 should next be determined be-
cause that Code section deals with events occurring prior in time
to the subject matter of section 4-406. Moreover, if the customer's
negligence in failing to detect subsequent forgeries or alterations
by the same wrongdoer is an issue, that determination may also
fall under section 3-406. Thus, if the bank's negligence under sec-
tion 3-406 is to be determined first, the bank will have the burden
of proving the propriety of its action in not detecting the forgery
or alteration. If the bank should fail in this undertaking and no
other bank defenses are available, then the customer would win.
If, however, the bank succeeds in proving that it used due care
under section 3-406, then it would proceed to try to prove the cus-
tomer's negligence under both section 3-406 as well as section 4-
406. The customer then would be compelled to both rebut the
bank's proof of the customer's negligence, and try to show the
bank's failure to act with "ordinary care" under section 4-406(3).
V. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS AND PERIODS OF LIMITATION: U.C.C.
SECTION 4-406
A. Generally
It is common practice for banks to send itemized monthly state-
ments to their customers, and to include checks that have been
paid from that customer's accounts. When this is done, section 4-
406 imposes certain duties and consequences with respect to a
customer's duty to give notice to the bank of forged or altered
checks. Essentially, these are as follows:
1. The customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness
to examine the statement and items, discover an unauthorized
signature or alteration on any item, and notify the bank
promptly.166
2. If the customer fails in this duty167 and the bank is not negli-
gent,168 the customer is precluded from claiming against the bank
for any such forged or altered item and any item forged or altered
by the same wrongdoer within fourteen days after the customer's
receipt of the first such item169
3. Without regard to negligence by either the customer or the
bank, the customer is absolutely barred from claiming against the
bank after one year with respect to the customer's unauthorized
signature or alteration on the face or back of the item; 7 0 and after
three years with respect to any unauthorized endorsement.'71
A customer's failure to detect forgeries or alterations by the
same wrongdoer could also preclude his claim against the bank
under section 3-406.172 Section 4-406(2) (b) however, would
supercede section 3-406 to the extent that it imposes a fourteen
day period of limitations on such recovery, 7 3 unless of course, the
bank is shown to be negligent under section 4-406(3).
B. When the Customer's Duties Begin
U.C.C. section 4-406(1) provides that the customer's duties be-
166. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
167. See supra § I and accompanying discussion.
168. U.C.C. § 4-406(3); see supra § III C and accompanying discussion.
169. U.C.C. § 4-406(2) (b).
170. U.C.C. § 4-406(4).
171. Id. California, Georgia, Nevada, Ohio, and Washington have varied the
time periods for the reporting of forged drawers' signatures, endorsements, or al-
terations. See generally ANDERSON, § 4-406:3.
172. See cases cited supra note 117.
173. U.C.C. § 4-102(1).
(VoL 10: 1, 19821 Forgery and Alteration Claims
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
come operative when the bank does any one of three things. The
customer has a duty to give notice of suspected impropriety if the
bank sends the statement and items to the customer; holds the
statement and items for the customer; or otherwise makes the
statement and items "available to the customer."174
A critical question, however, concerns precisely when the pe-
riod of limitation for notice to the bank begins to run. There ap-
pears to be a split of authority on the question of whether the
period begins when the statement and accompanying items are
placed in the mail by the bank, or when they are actually received
by the customer. Anderson takes the following position:
Under the definition of the word "send" in [section] 1-201(28), the bank
sends the items and statement when it puts them in the mail bearing the
proper address and postage. If these documents are sent, but not deliv-
ered to the depositor, they are nevertheless "sent", and the time of the
customer's investigation and report starts to run accordingly. 175
Anderson apparently relies upon the holding in Kiernan v. Union
Bank, 176 which held that the one-year notice period "began to run
from the date. . . on which the statement [was] mailed by the
bank to the customer."177 In this case, however, the customer was
claiming that the notice period should have been tolled because
his faithless employee intercepted the statement and failed to re-
port the forged items to the employer. The result reached in
Kiernan seems quite unreasonable and does not seem to be re-
quired by a careful reading of section 4-406. It seems unreasona-
ble to hold a customer responsible for the time obviously required
to mail the statement. Even section 1-201(38), which defines
"send," provides that sending is not perfected until "the time at
which it would have been received if properly sent." This implies
that the customer would have a duty to inquire only if the state-
ment and items did not arrive at the normal time.
A more reasonable interpretation of section 4-406(1) would rec-
ognize that although the customer's duties become "operative"178
when the statement and items are mailed, these duties presup-
pose either a receipt by the customer in due course or an oppor-
tunity to inquire of the bank if the statement is not received in
174. U.C.C. § 4-406 comment 2.
175. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 629.
176. 55 Cal. App. 3d 111, 127 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1976).
177. Id. at 444.
178. U.C.C. § 4-406 comment 2.
due course. 179 It should be noted that sections 4-406(2) (b) and 4-
406(4), which impose absolute time limitation, do not use or incor-
porate the term "send." Rather, in both subsections, the respec-
tive time limits run from the time when the statement and items
are "available to the customer."
The pre-section 4-406 cases were based on the theory of "ac-
count stated." Under this theory, the statement of account,
though prepared and ready for delivery, does not become a stated
account, with legal consequences, until it is actually placed in the
hands of the party to be charged.180 Expanding this idea, the bet-
ter reasoned section 4-406 cases have held or inferred that the
time limits provided by section 4-406 begin to run from the date
that the statement and items are received by the customer. For
example, it was held in George Whalley Company v. National City
Bank of Concord:
The date on which the first item was "available" to plaintiff then deter-
mines whether plaintiff can recover for the May forgeries. Plaintiff re-
ceived a bank statement and checks on approximately the third of each
month. Therefore, on or about February 3, 1972, plaintiff received its Janu-
ary statement which included the initial forged check dated January 24,
1972. The first item, then, was "available" to plaintiff on or about February
3, 1972.181
This view seems even more reasonable in those states where the
absolute time limits have been shortened by the legislatures.
182
C. What Constitutes Notice to the Bank
The Code does not require the customer to give any particular
form of notice to the bank that checks have been forged or al-
tered.183 However, cases have held that such notice generally
must be sufficient in content to "put the bank in a position to
179. Moreover, it has been held, in a pre-Code case, that the bank statements
and cancelled checks "must go to a person authorized by the [depositor] to re-
ceive such statements". The corporate depositor had a checking account clerk, but
the bank sent the statements to a person in another department; thus the require-
ments of the statute were not met. York Specialties Co. v. Bank of Buffalo, 30
A.D.2d 1044, 294 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1968).
180. McCarty v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 204 Ala. 424, 85 So. 2d 754, 757
(1920); Benge v. Michigan State Bank, 341 Mich. 441, 67 N.W.2d 721, 50 A.L.R.2d
1108, 1112 (1954); see generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1115 (1956).
181. See George Whalley Co. v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App.
2d 205, 380 N.E.2d 742 (1977); see also Hanover Ins. Co's. v. Brotherhood State
Bank, 482 F.2d 501, 504 (D.Kan., 1979); Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149,
304 A.2d 838, 845 (1973); Hardex-Steubenville Corp., Inc. v. W. Pennsylvania Nat'l
Bank, 446 Pa. 446, 285 A.2d 874, (1972). Cf. Winkler v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of
L'Anse, 42 Mich App. 740, 202 N.W.2d 468 (1972), where the court assumed that the
14-day period began to run "from the time that the [depositor] received the bank
statement .... Id.
182. These states are California, Nevada, Ohio, and Washington.
183. Oral notice is sufficient; see Duralite Co. v. New Jersey Bank & Trust Co.,
97 N.J. Super. 48, 234 A.2d 247 (1967).
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make an investigation with respect to the validity of the claim of
forgery .... ,,184 The details of the notice may depend upon the
circumstances of the loss. For example, if the forgeries have been
irregular or scattered, then more particularity is required in the
notice, such as "the amounts, dates and parties with respect to
each check."18 The notice can be more general, however, if it re-
lates to all checks cashed or paid by the bank over a period of
time. 8 6 Furthermore, the fact that the bank refuses to cash cer-
tain items not bearing authorized signatures is not considered no-
tice to the bank that previous items from the account of the same
customer were paid without authorized signatures. 8 7
D. Time Periods
1. Double forgery: 1 year or 3 years
Code section 4-406(4) gives the customer one year to report "his
unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of
the item," and three years to report "any unauthorized endorse-
ment."188 A question arises, however, concerning which period
should apply when there is a forgery of both the drawer's signa-
ture as well as the payee's endorsement.
Bank of Thomas County v. Dekle 189 was the first case to address
this question, and it gave the customer an option: if the customer
wanted to assert the forged drawer's signature, he had to give no-
tice within the shorter period. On the other hand, he could "still
184. First Nat'l Bank of Melbourne v. Sogaard and Debo, Inc., 406 F.2d 1128, 1131
(5th Cir. 1969); Nationwide Homes of Raleigh, N.C., Inc. v. First Citizens Bank and
Trust Co., 267 N.C. 528, 148 S.E.2d 693 (1966).
185. Id. See also American Bldg. Maintenance Co. of California v. Federation
Bank and Trust Co., 213 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Cf. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 108 Ga. App. 356, 113 S.E.2d 43 (1963) where the pre-
Code statute required the drawer to "notify ... [the bank] that said check bore a
forged or unauthorized endorsement." The drawer's letter to the bank, stating
that there were "some irregularities" in its accounts, and that certain endorsement
on "various checks" had been question, was held to be insufficient notice. Id.
186. First Nat'l Bank of Melbourne v. Sogaard and Debo, Inc., 406 F.2d at 1131.
187. King of All Mfg., Inc. v. Genessee Merchants Bank and Trust Co., 69 Mich.
App. 490, 245 N.W.2d 104 (1976).
188. These periods of limitation have been held to attach to each separate
check bearing an unauthorized signature, so that "a new ... period begins to run
with each subsequent check when it is made available to the customer." The
court distinguished U.C.C. § 4-406(2) where each check subsequent to the first is
held to be the responsibility of the drawer-customer after fourteen days. Neo-
Tech Systems, Inc. v. Provident Bank, 43 Ohio Misc. 31, 335 N.E.2d 395 (1974).
189. Bank of Thomas County v. Dekle, 119 Ga. App.-753, 168 S.E.2d 834 (1969).
rely on the forged endorsement . . . as a basis for unauthorized
payment if he [gave] the notice within the applicable [three year]
period."'190 Dekle was decided before the landmark case of Perini
Corp. v. First National Bank of Habersham County.191 Perini
held that a check with both a forged drawer's signature and a
forged endorsement was to be treated as if only the drawer's sig-
nature was forged, at least with respect to whether the drawee or
depositary bank should bear the loss under the "final payment"
rule. Following the Perini rationale concerning "double forger-
ies," at least two courts have held that checks bearing a forged
drawer's signature or material alteration, together with a forged
endorsement, should be treated as bearing only forged drawer's
signatures of alterations for purposes of applying the one-year or
three-year absolute time limitations of section 4-406(4).192 Thus,
the one-year period of limitations applies to checks bearing
"double forgeries."
It is also generally recognized that checks with fewer than the
required number of drawer's signatures are to be considered as
having an "unauthorized drawer's signature" in applying the one-
year period of limitation under section 4-406(4).193 Likewise,
checks showing fewer than the required number of endorsements
are to be treated as having "unauthorized endorsement" for pur-
poses of applying the three-year period of limitations.1 94
2. Variation by agreement or statute
Some banks include in their depositor's contracts or periodic
bank statements a provision that the customer waives the right to
claim for any debit not objected to within a specified period of
190. Id. at 838.
191. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398 (5th
Cir. 1977); see also Baker, The Perini Case: Double Forgery Revisited (Part II), 41
U.C.C. L.J. 54-56 (1978).
192. Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank of Whitefish Bay, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 299 N.W.2d
829 (1981); Sylvia v. Industrial Nat'l Bank of Rhode Island, 403 A.2d 1075, 1077 (R.I.
1979); see also Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 N.J. Super. 101, 422
A.2d 433 (1980), affd, N.J. Sup. Ct., Docket No. 17 (1981).
193. See Pine Bluff Nat'l Bank v. Kesterson, 257 Ark. 813, 520 S.W.2d 253 (1975);
King of All Mfg., Inc. v. Genessee Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 69 Mich App. 490,
245 N.W.2d 104 (1976); Neo-Tech Systems, Inc. v. Provident Bank, 43 Ohio Misc. 31,
335 N.E.2d 395 (1974); Rascar, Inc. v. Bank of Oregon, 87 Wis. 2d 446, 275 N.W.2d 108
(1978). However, there is a split of authority on this point; see, Wolfe v. Univ. Nat'l
Bank, 270 Md. 70, 310 A.2d 558 (1973); Far West Citrus, Inc. v. Bank of America, 91
Cal. App. 3d 913, 154 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1979); Madison Park Bank v. Field, 21 Ill. 583,
381 N.E.2d 1030 (1978). Professor Bailey has opined that "it would seem that the
one-year time limit for reporting ought to apply in all such instances." BAILEY,
BRADY ON BANK CHECKS, 26 (1981 Cum. Supp.) [hereinafter cited as BAILEY].
194. Trust Co. Bank v. Atlanta IBM Employees' Fed. Credit Union, 245 G. 262,
264 S.E.2d 202 (1980).
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time. Typically, these provisions shorten or modify the time lim-
its prescribed by section 4-406(4). Prior to the Code, the courts
generally looked upon such agreements with disfavor because of
the difficulty in showing assent by the customer.195 The Code ex-
pressly acknowledges the validity of such agreements, the only
limitation being that the bank cannot disclaim its responsibility to
act in "good faith" or with "ordinary care."196 Despite-this limita-
tion, the parties may "by agreement" determine the standards by
which such responsibility is to be measured, if such standards are
not "manifestly unreasonable." 97
Thus, a disclaimer which completely absolves the bank of re-
sponsibility for detecting forgeries or alterations would probably
be struck down as "manifestly unreasonable." 98 However, pre-
Code law would probably be given effect to the extent that a bank
rule requiring notice of an alteration within a limited period of
time can be given effect, if, a.) it is called to the depositor's atten-
tion, and b.) the depositor assents to the limitation. 99 However,
this bank rule could not excuse the bank's negligence in paying a
forged or altered check.200
Several states still have "Final Adjustment of Statement of Ac-
count" statutes 20 1 which establish a time limit after which the
customer may not question the correctness of his statement.
Such a provision would bar a customer's claim for a forged or al-
tered check if the time limit had elapsed and was shorter than the
absolute time limits provided in section 4-406.202 In fact, a five-day
statutory limitation was upheld in a case against a claim that it
was both inconsistent with the section 4-406(4) one-year period
195. See BAILEY, supra note 193, at § 26.11.
196. U.C.C. § 4-103(1).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., State ex re. Gabalae v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346
N.E.2d 326 (1975), refusing to give effect to a bank imposed ten-day period of
limitations.
199. See BAILEY, supra note 193, at § 26.11.
200. See New York Creditmen's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover
Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 914, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1973), where an agreement between the
depositor and drawee bank, which provided that the depositor agree to report for-
geries within a time period shorter than the time requirement of U.C.C. § 4-406,
was held to be enforceable. An agreement which merely shortens the period for
reporting does not, per se, absolve the bank from its negligence or obligation to act
in "good faith" under U.C.C. § 4-103(1).
201. See PATON, PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 8:5 (Supp. 1980) (contain-
ing a list of states having such statutes).
202. See BAILEY, supra note 193, at § 26.19.
and "unduly harsh."203 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sympa-
thetically replied that "although we may question the equities of
a five-day notice requirement, we cannot assume a legislative role
and deny the statute's validity."204
3. Absolute time limits: not statutes of limitation
The one-year and three-year periods of limitation provided by
section 4-406(4) are not regarded as "statutes of limitation;"
rather, they terminate substantive rights and, therefore, cannot
be tolled.205 However, when a bank sends statements and can-
celled checks to a customer, this may have the effect of triggering
an applicable statute of limitations.20 6
4. Actions based on common law theories
U.C.C. section 4-406(4) states that "without regard to care or
lack of care of either the customer or the bank," a customer who
does not notify the bank of forged signatures or alterations within
the requisite time periods "is precluded from asserting against
the bank" such forged signatures or alterations. Most certainly,
these time limits are applicable to the bank's liability to the cus-
tomer under the Code; but questions arise concerning the applica-
bility of common law actions such as breach of contract,
conversion or negligence.
In Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 207 the Supreme
Court of California allowed a drawer to sue a depositary bank on
a common law negligence theory for cashing certain altered
checks. The bank raised section 4-406(4) as a defense, since the
altered checks had been returned to the drawer more than one
year prior to notice to the bank. The court, however, rejected the
defense, holding: "Subdivision (4) of section 2-206 applies only to
actions based on warranties set forth in California Uniform Com-
mercial Code. We think it clear that the rules set forth in section
406 are not intended to apply to negligence actions."20 8
Similarly, in Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties
203. First Nat'l City Bank v. Compania De Aquaceros, 398 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.
1968).
204. Id. at 783.
205. See Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. FACO, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. App. 1980); Bill-
ings v. East River Savings Bank, 33 A.D.2d 997, 307 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1970). However,
one court, reading U.C.C. § 4-406(4) in pari matenia with U.C.C. § 4-406(5), found
that the absolute bar periods "may be waived by a payor bank by failure to assert
same". Stouffer v. Oakwood Bank, 19 Ohio App. 2d 68, 249 N.E.2d. 848, 852 (1969).
206. Kiernan v. Union Bank, 55 Cal. App. 3d 111, 127 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1976).
207. 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
208. Id. at 699, 582 P.2d at 939, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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Trust Co., 2 09 a depositor brought suit against the drawee bank for
cashing checks without the required endorsements. The court
noted that the time bar provisions of section 4-406(4) did not ap-
ply since the customer's action was essentially based "upon the
bank's failure to act reasonably to protect its customer's inter-
ests, '210 i.e., breach of contract.
However, both the Sun'n Sand and Kraftsman decisions were
criticized and distinguished in a New Jersey Superior Court deci-
sion.21 ' In Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First National Bank, the
drawers claimed that they could avoid the section 4-406(4) time
limitations by "couching their claim based on forged signatures in
different terms, viz. negligence, conversion, money had and re-
ceived and breach of contract." 212 The Court rejected these
claims, noting that without regard to the theory of liability, the
facts of liability were based on the bank's payment of an item not
otherwise properly payable. Consequently, the Court held that
any claim based on such facts, without regard to the theory of lia-
bility, is subject to the time period limitations of section 4-406(4).
VI. CONCLUSION
A bank, when presented with a check forgery or alteration
claim, must first determine where it fits in the pattern of rights
and obligations under Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. This position will be determined by the nature of the defal-
cation; for example, a forged drawer's signature or endorsement, a
material alteration, or a combination of these.
Second, the bank will look to the array of potential defenses to
the check forgery or alteration claim. The availability of particu-
lar defenses provided by Articles 3 and 4 will also be largely de-
termined by the bank's position in the Code's pattern of rights
and obligations. Frequently, the bank will find that the claimant's
negligence may have contributed to the forgery or alteration
(U.C.C. section 3-406) or that the claimant was derelict in giving
notice of the deed to the drawee bank (U.C.C. section 4-406). It is
possible that both these defenses will be available.
Although the bank both determines its rights and obligations
209. 169 N.J. 488, 404 A.2d 1288 (1979).
210. Id. at 490 n.2, 404 A.2d at 1290, n.2.
211. Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 N.J. 101, 422 A.2d 433, affd,
N.J. Sup. Ct., Docket No. 17, 870 (1981).
212. Id. at 105, 422 A.2d at 437-38.
and takes inventory of potential Code defenses, its legal analysis
is not yet complete. The reason for the uncertainty lies in the
Code's failure to achieve one of its chief objectives: "Uniformity
throughout American Jurisdictions." 213 If this article has demon-
strated nothing else, it has shown that the bank's rights, obliga-
tions, and potential defenses to check forgery or alteration claims
are by no means certain; nor are they uniform among the states
and federal jurisdictions. Moreover, because Articles 3 and 4 of
the Code are difficult to master, judges sometimes make bad
law. 2 14 While these difficulties cause consternation among bank-
ers, they allow for great creativity by bankers' counsel. No claim
or defense to check forgery or alteration claims should be dis-
missed simply because it cannot be found under a specific Code
section or in a reported decision.215 To do so may not only be a
disservice to one's client; it may be a dereliction of duty.
Notwithstanding bankers' consternation or opportunities for
creativity by counsel, the twin objectives of uniformity of the law
and predictability of judicial decision are not being served. A
thorough review of Articles 3 and 4 should be undertaken so that
stability in this troublesome area of the law may be achieved.
213. General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute, 1972 Official Text, p. IX. See also
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (c).
214. See e.g., the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in National Bank
& Trust Co. of Central Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 9 Commw. of Pa. 358, 361,
305 A.2d 769, 772 (1973), as to the meaing of negligence in 3-406; the court subse-
quently reversed itself in 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976).
215. Consider, e.g., Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225
(D.C.N.J. 1979), holding that the depositary bank may have a common law cause of
action against the negligent drawer. The case was called "precedent-shattering"
by Prof. Bailey, supra note 193 at § 23.11. See also Sun'n Sand, In. v. United Cal.
Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920 (1978), which allowed a drawer to base its claim
on the depositary bank's allowed common law negligence in the face of U.C.C. § 4-
406(4), which would bar a claim "without regard to care or lack of care of either
the customer or the bank."
